

When my daughter was two years old, I promised her I would build a playhouse for her birthday. We thought she needed a place where she could exercise her imagination, and a playhouse seemed like a perfect idea.

Weeks went by, and then months, and suddenly her third birthday was coming up, and I realized that if I kept dragging this project out, days turning into weeks and then months, I would one day find that time has passed me by—that she would move on to other things, that I would be out frantically hammering on the playhouse deck while she got in the car and drove off to visit friends.

That experience came back to me as I read the Y-12 site wide EIS, DOE's plan for its own playhouse of death.

DOE first identified the need for this EIS in 1995, in a letter Vic Reis sent to OREPA. And now, more than five years later, we have a draft document. The plans for DOE's terrible playhouse—the first descriptions of the bomb plant of the future—start with the statement of purpose and need (page 5-15 in your programs). This statement is the pretense on which this document is built. The reality is that we have no need for a new bomb building plant—not for any part of a new bomb building plant. Time and events have already overtaken DOE's playhouse of death.

Even since this document went to the printers, world events have wiped away the assumptions on which the "need" is based. We've outgrown the playhouse of death just as surely as my daughter is growing up. Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, has called for extensive arms reductions, taking our arsenals down below the 1500 level contemplated by START 3—numbers already agreed to in principle by both nations.

Yet the Y-12 EIS is built on the need for an arsenal of 6000 nuclear

Comment No. 1

Issue Code: 16

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has significantly reduced the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile, and DOE has dismantled more than 15,000 nuclear weapons. At the present time, the United States is further downsizing its deployed nuclear weapons stockpile consistent with the terms of START I and START II. Although Russia suspended its nuclear weapons dismantlement activities on January 20, 2001, DOE has continued weapons dismantlement activities. While future arms control reductions may change requirements for maintaining the weapons stockpile, DOE is responsible for meeting the current requirements set forth by the President and Congress. The need for nuclear weapons and the issue of how many nuclear weapons the United States maintains as a nuclear deterrent are beyond the scope of the Y-12 SWEIS.

1/16

1/16
(cont.)

Anonymous A

Page 2 of 4

weapons. What "need" is that? Have our Presidents, Clinton and Bush, taken leave of their senses in agreeing with the Russians that we will reduce our arsenals far below the 6,000 level? Even such nuclear hawks as Paul Nitze, Reagan's arms control man, agree with the cuts!

And President Bush in his campaign called for additional unilateral cuts—this is the policy direction of the future for this administration. Time has passed by the "need" articulated as the basis for this grand playhouse of death.

This is the reality DOE must face as it goes back to turn this draft into a final document. We no longer need the playhouse.

Secondly, I want to address one other fundamental flaw in this document, and that is the credibility of those who present it to us. I don't mean Gary—I don't know him at all. I mean the Department of Energy.

The assurances presented by this document about health and safety can not be taken at face value, and the numbers presented to back them up should not be trusted any more than numbers I might pull out of thin air today. I say that for three simple reasons:

First, look at what this document says about Environmental Justice. The statement that communities of color are not disproportionately affected by releases from Y-12 is a flat lie. It is contradicted by history, by DOE's own studies, by the experience of people living in Scarboro, by simple common sense.

Second, consider that the agency assuring us of protections for workers and the public is the very same agency that, according to its Inspector General just four months ago, demonstrated that it has not made a long-term commitment to worker health and safety. Despite more than two years of virtual harassment by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, crucial fire systems remain untested, and those that were tested had a 50% failure rate. This is worker protection? We should believe these people?

And then, exhibit three. The recent acknowledgement by DOE that workers at Portsmouth, Paducah and K-25 were, over the years, subjected to exposures to radioactive and hazardous materials—and that these exposed workers were not only not informed, they were given false assurances—lies—by management and government officials. Not a few rogue plant managers—deception was institutionalized policy. Individuals made decisions that, in the interests of bomb production, people would not be told the truth, would not even be given proper

Comment No. 2

Issue Code: 14

DOE believes that it has adequately addressed health and safety impacts that could result from implementing the various alternatives. Volume I, Chapter 5 of the Y-12 SWEIS addresses impacts the proposed action and alternatives. Volume II, Appendix D and E provide further detailed analyses related to human health effects from normal operations/facility accidents and air quality, respectively. Appendix A discusses the actions taken at specific facilities at Y-12 in response to fire and worker safety. (See also the response to Comment No. 26 on page 217.)

1/16
(cont.)

Comment No. 3

Issue Code: 13

DOE is committed to compliance with provisions of Executive Order 12898, *Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations*. The environmental justice analysis was prepared in accordance with the CEQ's guidelines of environmental justice under NEPA. The Y-12 SWEIS addresses the issue of whether implementation of the proposed action or alternatives would result in disproportionately high and adverse environmental effects on minority or low-income populations. CEQ's guidance further states that an environmental effect must be significant to qualify as disproportionately high and adverse, where significant is defined by CEQ's implementation recommendations (see 40 CFR Part 1508.27). As discussed in Volume I, Chapter 5, Sections 5.12 and 5.13 of the Y-12 SWEIS, implementation of the alternatives for the continuation of the Y-12's weapons support mission, and the construction and operation of new facilities for the HEU Storage and Special Materials missions at Y-12 would pose no significant radiological or nonradiological health risks to the public. The conservatively estimated dose to the MEI for Alternative 4 would be approximately 4.5 mrem/year, which is below the NESHAP standard of 10 mrem/year. The risks would not be significant regardless of the racial, ethnic, and economic composition of potentially affected populations. (See also the response to Comment No. 20 regarding the Scarboro Community on page 212.)

2/14

3/13

2/14
(cont.)

Anonymous A

Page 3 of 4

equipment to protect themselves. Now these were not government bureaucrats off in DC, this was Oak Ridge Operations. These plants were managed by DOE and contractor officials here.

The documentation presented in this EIS—and the even more prevalent undocumented assertions—to support DOE’s analysis of the environmental, health and safety impacts of these proposed facilities is simply not credible. It defies belief.

2/14
(cont.)

This EIS, we note for the record, reflects a commitment to do something we would allow no other nation on earth to do. This EIS contains plans for the first facility in a new complex for the production of weapons of mass destruction in defiance of the 1996 findings of the World Court, undermining US nonproliferation policy, and violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the conscience of human kind.

1/16
(cont.)

This EIS contains a computer generated rendering of the new bomb facility—page 32 of the Summary. Look upon this scene imagined by DOE and created by the computer—the sun shines down roofs of cheery blue metal or gray gravel; even the trees cast shadows in this imagined world. And bold red words identify the buildings of the Special Materials Complex. But the words are hard to understand for those of us not in the inner circles of death, those of us who are not familiar with the language of the annihilation of life as we know it and the destruction of creation.

But the words are not important; they are only symbols for the activities going on inside. Isostatic Press Facility—it might as well say crematorium. Purification facility—a perfect euphemism for a gas chamber?

Are these words troubling? Of course. But they are not unfair.

What is the difference between the evil of Germany, with its plan for world dominance, and our pursuit of unapproachable and complete nuclear domination of the earth, all its nations, all its peoples? Is this not the sole justification for our nuclear weapons? Can we not see in ourselves what is so clear in others?

Yet this is true. We alone have used nuclear weapons in war; we have threatened their use against civilian populations. We have used radioactive weapons in the last decade. And it is the firm and unyielding policy of our government, in the face of universal opposition, that we will reserve to ourselves the right of “first strike.”



I see, and I say stop. We say stop. In the name of God, in the name of

Anonymous A

Page 4 of 4

the future, in the name of humanity, in the name of hope, in the name of peace, in the name of our treaties and our national honor, in the name of our children: Sarah Margaret and Emma, we say stop. In the name of Peter and Ingrid and Maggie, we say stop. In the name of Hannah and Emma and Joe we say stop. In the name of Bobby and Mary and Rachel and Carlos and Kellen, we say stop. In the name of Ali and Erin and Angle and India and Mackenzie and Forest and Julia, we say stop. In the name of Rhiannon and Chelsey and Gracie and Frank, we say stop. In the name of Bashir and Eliot and Savannah and Cierra, we say stop. In the name of Darius and Mark and Christie and Caleb, we say stop. In the name of Cassie and Natalie and Sarah and Jordan and Hailey we say stop. These are children I know and love. You have others on your list, in your heart—

For all of them. We must afford to stop building these bombs that threaten their future. And we can not afford not to stop.

Thank you.