Office of Environment, Safety and Health Support Manual to the Process Guide for the Identification and Disposition of Suspect/Counterfeit and Defective Items at Department of Energy Facilities

WORKING DRAFT

Prepared by
U.S. Department of Energy:
Office of Environment, Safety and Health
Office of Corporate Performance Assessment

July 2004

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ACRONYMS

DCS	Data Collection Sheet
DNFSB	Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
DOE	Department of Energy
EH	Office of Environment, Safety and Health
EM	Office of Environmental Management
FE	Office of Fossil Energy
GC	Office of General Counsel
GIDEP	Government/Industry Data Exchange Program
HQ	Headquarters
IG	Inspector General
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
LOI	Lines of Inquiry
NA	National Nuclear Security Administration
NE	Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OA	Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance
OE	Operating Experience Program
ORPS	Occurrence Reporting and Processing System
POC	Point of Contact
PSO	Program Secretarial Officer
QA	Quality Assurance
SC	Office of Science
S/CI	Suspect or Counterfeit Item

Revision: _____ Effective Date: _____

Approved

_____ _____

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Corporate Performance Assessment Date

Recommended

_____ _____

Director, Office of Analytical Studies Date

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In the Deputy Secretary's March 18, 2003 letter to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) was assigned responsibility for identifying, evaluating, monitoring, managing, and resolving crosscutting safety issues. As part of this effort, EH has assumed responsibility for activities associated with suspect/counterfeit items (S/CIs) or defective items from the Department of Energy (DOE) Quality Assurance Working Group (QAWG). This process guide support manual provides direction to EH on implementing the S/CI and defective item process.

The Office of Corporate Performance Assessment (EH-3) will use the process guide and supporting manual to collect, screen, disposition, and communicate information on S/CI or defective items that could potentially impact operations at DOE facilities.

2.0 SUPPORT MATERIAL TO THE EH PROCESS GUIDE

The information contained in this support manual provides instructions on how to access various databases and examples of documents that EH-3 personnel will be required to develop as part of their activities in implementing the EH S/CI and defective item process. Example documents should be modified as required to meet specific needs.

3.0 DATABASE ACCESS INSTRUCTIONS AND SAMPLE FORMS

3.1 EH-3 Data Collection Sheet

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OPERATING EXPERIENCE WORKING GROUP DATA COLLECTION SHEET		
ISSUE CPSC Recall of Light Fixtures		
TRACKING NUMBER DCS 655	**SOURCE OF ISSUE** GIDEP	**SOURCE TRACKING NUMBER** AAN-U-04-76 (CED 04-01-04)
DESCRIPTION		
The following product safety recall was conducted by the firm in cooperation with the Consumer Product Safety Commission. Consumers should stop using the product immediately unless otherwise instructed. **Name of Product**: High Intensity Discharge (HID) light fixtures with acrylic lenses and/or reflectors **Units**: About 52,600 **Manufacturer**: Lithonia Lighting, of Conyers, Ga. **Hazard**: A component in the light fixture can leak fluid, which can degrade the acrylic lenses and reflectors, causing them to crack and fall. Falling pieces of acrylic can injure someone below the fixture. **Incidents/Injuries**: Lithonia is aware of 42 incidents where pieces of acrylic fell from fixtures. One person suffered a laceration on his forehead when a piece of an acrylic lens fell. **Description**: These are Indoor HID light fixtures with acrylic lenses and/or reflectors. They are generally used in industrial and commercial locations such as retail spaces, warehouses, and gymnasiums. Only certain models of specific wattage lights are included in the recall. Check the Lithonia Web site for a list of the specific model and wattage combinations included. All recalled fixtures were manufactured in Crawfordsville, Indiana, and have a date of manufacture from November 2002 through October 2003. The models, wattages, city and date of manufacture, and "Lithonia" can be found on a label attached to the ballast housing. **Sold by**: Lighting and electrical supply distributor nationwide from November 2002 through February 2004. **Manufactured In**: USA **Remedy**: Building owners and managers with recalled fixtures should contact Lithonia to verify that the fixtures are included in the recall and arrange for a replacement of the fixture or faulty component. Lithonia and their distributors are directly notifying customers who purchased the recalled fixtures. **Consumer Contact**: Lithonia Lighting 866-345-2294 8am-5pm ET M-F www.lithonia.com/indoorHIDacrylicrecall/		

DATE	OE GROUP ACTION
04-21-04	Potential DOE applicability – Post on S/C-DI website as a defective Item

3.2 Final ORPS Report Follow-up

An important aspect of determining the significance of ORPS related S/CI or defective items starts when the initial ORPS event is researched. Many times the initial report indicates that additional work is being conducted by any of a variety of organizations. This may have an impact on how EH-3 will disposition the item. Where such follow-up work is indicated, EH-3 will flag the item for follow-up. The *Non-Routine To-Do List* located on the EH-3 "O" drive at ***O:\QA EH-3 and historical QAWG\Follow-up SCDI\SCDI To Do List*** shall be updated to indicate that follow-up is needed.

In order to assure that significant events are acted upon in a timely manner, EH-3 shall conduct routine searches in ORPS to determine whether any final reports have been issued for items flagged for follow-up. The following search process has been developed for this purpose:

1. Type in the Boolean Logic Box: (14 or 17) and 35
2. Hit Refine
3. In box 14, under Nature of Occurrence, select: Search RC Only. Under Reporting Criteria, select 4C(1), 4C(2), and 4C(3).4. In box 17, under HQ Keyword Before 2003, select: Search New HQ Keywords Only. Under HQ Keyword On/After 2003, select 11E and 11H.
4. In box 35, select >/= to your date.
5. Hit Finished Searching.

In order to keep track of the final ORPS reports identified during the routine searches, EH-3 shall download "html" ORPS query to the EH-3 "O" drive at ***O:\QA EH-3 and historical QAWG\ORPS-OBITT Searches\Final ORPS report updates***. This will assist in maintaining a record of the work conducted, allow for future viewing to assist in analysis, and provide an easy source to access when compiling information for the annual S/CI report.

3.3 GIDEP Access and Data Download Process

1. As with ORPS, access to this website requires a User ID and password which are obtained through GIDEP that are active for a 6 month period. Users are notified when the 6 month date is approaching and to change their password within approximately 30 days of expiration.

2. Section 3.4 contains the forms users need to fill out and submit to GIDEP at (FAX) 909-273-5200 to obtain a User ID and password.

3. Information on how to join is located at the Internet website: **http://www.gidep.org/**.

4. Approximately twice weekly, the EH-3 OE Group logs on (Slide 0) and accesses the GIDEP database by selecting "Enter Now" (Slide 1 below) and then "Search Database" (Slide 2 below) at**:** **http://members.gidep.org/gidep.htm** . While there are many issues involving defective items posted on this website, S/CI events are rarely observed.

Slide 0

Slide 1



Slide 2



5. Relevant S/CI and defective item information can be accessed from the "GIDEP Database" by selecting "Advanced Ssearch" (Slide 3). Within this database, "Failure Experience:" (Slide 4) should be selected.

Slide 3

Slide 4



6. Next, select "Computer Entry Date" (Slide 5)

Slide 5



7. Next, select the desired period of time for the posted events during that timeframe (Slide 6). Then review the posted GIDEP events for S/CI or defective item occurrences.

Slide 6



8. Download each of the relevant S/CI and defective item (Slide 7) as individual files onto the "O" drive at O:\QA EH-3 and historical QAWG\GIDEP searches\EH-3 GIDEP searches May 2003 and after.

Slide 7



9. Following the download of the GIDEP S/CI or defective item, log off the system and select the "Utilization Report" portion of the website (Slide 8) if at least one individual GIDEP event was accessed during the session.

Slide 8



10. If the event accessed did not contain relevant S/CI or defective item information that will be discussed at the daily OE Group meeting, then fill out a "no impact report."

11. If the event does contain relevant S/CI or defective item information that will be discussed at the daily OE Group meeting, then fill out a, "Impact Report" for that event. Section 3.4 contains a sample statement that can be inserted into the explanation section of the impact report. Also, check off and fill out an estimated cost savings, where designated, for $1000 and then submit the report.

12. This process must be repeated for each GIDEP event that is accessed. While these reports need to be filled out before the end of the fiscal year, it is encouraged that the process be followed during each access session so that the report load is not over burdensome and to prevent the possibility of forgetting to complete the reports at a later date. The EH-3 lead for GIDEP will review draft GIDEP utilization reports, and approve and submit them to GIDEP electronically (Figures 9 and 10). Failure to complete the reports will eventually result in GIDEP database access denial.

Figure 9



Figure 10



3.3 GIDEP Access and Data Download Process (continued)

12. The DCS shall be maintained at **O:\EH-3\QA EH-3and historical QAWG\Data Collection Sheets.**

13. Section 3.1 contains a sample DCS.

14. The GIDEP Help Desk (909-273-4677) can answer questions regarding authorizations and access.

3.4 Sample GIDEP Utilization Report Statement for S/CI with potential DOE Impact

The impact associated with capturing this GIDEP report was that potentially significant quality assurance issues were identified that might affect the effectiveness and safety of operations at DOE facilities. This information was forwarded to relevant DOE personnel to read and take corrective action, where appropriate. The savings of this exercise is that one person was performing the work to avoid duplication of effort by upwards of 100 persons in our field offices. The effort included reading all of the GIDEP Database titles during a given time period, opening up and reading all reports that appeared to have potential quality assurance significance, capturing the relevant information from the reports deemed significant, and providing the information to the DOE EH-3 for distribution to appropriate personnel at our field offices.

Estimated cost savings – total time spent for the report is about 15 minutes from initial look at the title to providing the information for distribution. The average hourly rate for the employees is about $40. Hence, 0.25 hours x $40 = $10/employee/event x 100 employees = $1000 saved for this report.

3.5 Sample GIDEP Participation Request Form

3.5 Sample GIDEP User Authorization Form (continued)

GIDEP USER AUTHORIZATION
(ONE FORM IS REQUIRED FOR EACH GIDEP DATABASE USER)

Reserved for Office Use Only
AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEM APPROVAL (IAWAL Corona, CA AIS SECURITY OFFICER) APPROVED: DENIED: DATE:

By signing this authorization I certify, as a authorized GIDEP official business user, that I:

1. Have read and understand the Information Security Policy below dated 2 August 1999.
2. Agree to comply with the terms and conditions of the Policy shown below.

1. USER NAME (TYPE OR PRINT):		2. DEPT/MS:	3. PHONE: ( )
4. Job Title	City of Birth (for security use)	5. E-MAIL ADDRESS	
6. SIGNATURE:	7. ORGANIZATION:		8. PARTICIPANT CODE: (if assigned)

9. PRIMARY AREA(s) OF INTEREST: (Select all that apply.)

☐ Engineering Data	☐ Failure Experience Data	☐ Reliability Maintainability Data
☐ Metrology Data	☐ Product Information Data (DMS/MS)	

10. HOW DID YOU HEAR ABOUT GIDEP? (Select all that apply.)

☐ World Wide Web	☐ Exhibit/Show _____	☐ Clinic _____(Year)
☐ GIDEP Representative	☐ GIDEP Workshop_____	(Year / Location)
☐ Contractor	☐ Other	
_____		

This Part Must Be Completed by the GIDEP Representative

I support, as the GIDEP REPRESENTATIVE, the policies and procedures stated in the INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY. I will notify the GIDEP OPERATIONS CENTER if THE ABOVE GIDEP USER no longer requires access to the GIDEP databases. This application may be stored electronically and the scanned signature will be treated as an original signature.

22. GIDEP REPRESENTATIVE (TYPE OR PRINT):	23. DATE:
24. SIGNATURE:	

INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY

2 August 1999

Purpose: To make known general Automated Information Systems (AIS) security guidelines for accessing databases where communication is via approved Internet web or modem to U. S. Government (NAVY) computer systems.

Scope: These procedures set forth the basic AIS security protocol for signing-on, signing-off and general use of the host computer system. These security guidelines comply with DoD Manual 5220.22M and OPNAVINST 5239.1A. Access to GIDEP information is controlled though a series of good operating practices and privileged passwords assigned to authorize users. Misuse of passwords and the access obtained by their usage can result in denial of further GIDEP usage and possible penalties under 18 USC 1905 and other applicable statutory regulations.

Password Control The GIDEP representative for each participating activity will submit a GIDEP USER AUTHORIZATION (GUA) form for each user to the GIDEP Operations Center. The GIDEP Operations Center will issue a temporary password for each new user identified on the GUA. This password is valid for a period of fifteen (15) days and must be changed by the user before accessing the GIDEP database. The password should be changed at three to six month intervals, but no longer than six months, or anytime actual or suspected compromise of the password has occurred.
When the user resigns, has been terminated, transfers, or has no further authorized use for his/her passwords, immediately notified the GIDEP Operations Center Help Desk by e-mail (gidep@gidep.corona.navy.mil) or Phone (909) 273-4677.

Do NOT share your passwords. You are responsible for all activity initiated under your password.

Do NOT leave the computer unattended when logged on to GIDEP. Terminate web access when a session is completed.

Report suspected tampering or security violations to the company security personnel and the GIDEP Operations Center. Stop processing data until the system can be checked.

Data Management Do not process classified information. Protect all GIDEP information (hard copy and electronic media) from unauthorized disclosure. If in doubt about proper security procedures, please contact your security manager and/or the GIDEP Operations Center for further assistance or information.
0101

3.6 INPO Access and Data Download Process

1. Each EH-3 INPO user can access the INPO website (http://www.inpo.org/inpo/HomePage.asp) from their personnel work computer following logon..

2. Enter the User name and password. Obtain both from Earl Carnes, EH (301-903-5255). Earl changes the logon password every 6 months.

3. Select "Nuclear Network."

4. Select “Technical Exchange.”



5. Select “Plant Event Reports” which are operating experience reports posted daily as they are reported by industry nuclear plants.



6. Select “Plant Events Reports: Operating Experience Reports”



7. Access individual reports of interest and download onto the “O” drive at **O:\EH-3\QA EH-3 and historical QAWG\Data Collection Sheets.**



8. Logoff the INPO website.

3.7 Sample Lines of Inquiry

The investigation should address the following lines of inquiry to determine if DOE facilities have procured and/or used *material/parts, components or equipment* supplied by *company name* or *company name* vendors and if so, what actions need to be taken.

1. Has site contractor(s) (including their subs) procured or used material/parts, components or equipment that may have been heat-treated, supplied or tested by *company name* after *date*?

2. Has site contractor(s) (including their subs) procured or used material/parts, components or equipment that may have been supplied or tested by *company name* from vendors/suppliers identified on the attached list (*Attach vendor list if applicable*), after *date*?

3. If material/parts, components or equipment heat-treated, supplied or tested by *company name* or *company name* vendors were procured, were they identified as nonconforming and either removed or technically justified for use?

4. If you discover that site contractor(s) (or subs) have or use material/parts, components or equipment, supplied or tested by *company name* or *company name* vendors:
   a. Determine whether these material/parts, components or equipment are installed in any system performing a safety function (i.e., safety class or significant system) or if they are intended for use in a safety system but are still in inventory; or if installed or intended for use in mission-sensitive application. If you discover parts in safety systems, please perform engineering evaluation to determine any reliability impact, if possible, remove these items from service immediately or during regular scheduled maintenance and perform an engineering evaluation to qualify items that can be left in place, including technical justification for doing so.
   b. Collect and track information on procurement and use of *company name* material/parts, components or equipment for non-safety related systems. Tracking the use of these potential nonconforming or suspect parts may be an issue because nonconforming parts can and have later end up in safety applications.

5. Information collected should include the contractor/supplier/vendor by site, type of materials, and quantity. Other information such as part number or model number and application/systems may be useful information to share with other DOE sites.

6. Determine the cost associated with this investigation. The Office of Inspector General will attempt to recover the cost associated with the investigation. The cost should be broken into categories: total cost for man-hours; total cost for disposition of material (i.e., replacement cost, scrap cost, etc.); total cost for travel (if any) and total cost for testing (if any). It is not necessary to submit backup documentation, but your respective sites should maintain it in case the costs are changed later.

7. Identify training provided by the DOE and the contractor in the area of suspect counterfeit parts per DOE Order 440.1A, Worker Protection Management for DOE and Federal Contractor Employees.

3.8 Sample EH-1 Memorandum to PSOs

MEMORANDUM TO: RAYMOND ORBACH, SC-1
CARL MICHAEL SMITH, FE-1
WILLIAM MAGWOOD, NE-1
DAVID GARMAN, EE-1
MARGARET CHU, RW-1

FROM: BEVERLY A. COOK
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH

SUBJECT: Investigation of the Use of Improperly Heat Treated Aluminum Supplied by Temperform USA

On February 14, 2003, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) sent a letter to the Secretary requesting a report " …that documents implementation of the complete set of actions required to verify that no aluminum parts heat-treated by Temperform USA are in use in safety-related or mission-sensitive applications." The potential implications of improperly heat-treated aluminum supplied by Temperform and in use within the Department goes beyond defense nuclear facilities. The Secretary's Office has assigned me as the lead for this issue and the purpose of this memorandum is to request your assistance in completing the investigation into the possible use of improperly heat-treated aluminum material/parts from Temperform.

Although the DOE Quality Assurance Working Group has collected a substantial amount of information, it is not clear that the investigation results were adequate and/or consistent. I request that you complete or verify that your investigation is complete based on the attached lines of inquiry (Attachment 1). This will help us determine in a consistent manner if the Department has procured and/or used heat-treated aluminum material/parts or equipment supplied by Temperform or Temperform vendors and if so, what actions need to be taken.

To support this effort, please provide a schedule by April 30, 2003, for completing your investigation to address the attached lines of inquiry. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service has given permission to release to Department contractors the affected part numbers and the identity of the companies that sent parts to Temperform. Attachment 2 is a list of the companies who had parts processed at Temperform and/or who approved Temperform as a vendor. The part number list is a 1,200 plus page document and can be provided, if needed.

Based on your input, we will prepare a report to document our findings. I have assigned Mr. Ray Hardwick as the senior manager in EH to coordinate both the response to the Temperform issue and to suggest a corporate process to ensure adequate disposition of future issues. I also request that you designate a senior manager from your organization to work with Mr. Hardwick on these issues.

3.8 Sample EH-1 Memorandum to PSOs (continued)

If you have any questions concerning this request, please call me or Mr. Hardwick at (202) 586-0307.

Attachments

cc:
R. Hardwick, EH-2
R. Milner, RW-1
M. Johnson, SC-1
G. Staffo, EE-3C
C. Zamuda, FE-7
R. Lange, NE-40

3.9 Sample Investigation Closeout Package

MEMORANDUM TO: GREGORY FRIEDMAN
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

FROM: BEVERLY A. COOK
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH

SUBJECT: Results of Investigation of the Use of Improperly Heat Treated Aluminum Supplied by Temperform USA

Over the past several months the Department has been investigating the use of improperly heat treated aluminum supplied by Temperform USA. The Secretary's Office assigned me as the lead for this issue and the purpose of this memorandum is to provide a consolidated report of the results of the investigations across the Department. The results of the investigations conducted at the Department's defense nuclear facilities have been forwarded to the Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in response to concerns they expressed earlier in the year.

The attached report provides a summary of the results of the investigation, including the cost associated with conducting the investigation. While the investigation indicates that some of our sites did have procurements involving Temperform USA or its vendors, we have not identified any safety issues associated with the procurement or use of these parts and materials. The reported cost associated with this investigation is $240,737.77.

Specific information related to individual site investigations may be obtained by contacting the responsible program office directly. If you would like assistance in doing this, or require additional information from my Office, please contact Mr. Frank Russo at (301) 903-8008.

cc:
E. Beckner, NA-10
J. Roberson, EM-1
R. Orbach, SC-1
W. Magwood, NE-1
C.M. Smith, FE-1
D. Garman, EE-1
M. Chu, RW-1
L. Otis, GC-1

3.9 Sample Investigation Closeout Package (continued)

M. Whitaker, S-3.1
R. Hardwick, EH-2
F. Russo, EH-3
J. Mangeno, NA-3.6
X. Ascanio, NA-124
S. Johnson, EM-5
R. Milner, RW-1
M. Johnson, SC-1
G. Staffo, EE-3C
C. Zamuda, FE-7
R. Lange, NE-40
B. Burdick, IG - 221
P. Gervas, GC-61
F. Tooper, EH-32

U. S. Department of Energy

Report on Results of Temperform USA Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20585

November 5, 2003

Background

In June 2002 the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) issued an Agency Action Notice regarding the improper heat treating of aluminum parts by Temperform USA. The notice indicated that Temperform USA allegedly provided false certifications of heat treating processes and quality inspections from 1998 to at least 2000 on numerous Department of Defense (DoD) programs. Although the notice was directed primarily at DoD, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and commercial prime contractors involved with aviation and aeronautical programs, the notice did recommend that other organizations "... review all orders or procurements associated to aluminum alloy parts, (especially parts identified as "flight safety critical") for possible impact...."

In response to that GIDEP Notice, the DOE Quality Assurance Working Group (QAWG) sent an email to its members in July 2002 requesting information to determine if any weapons systems, support devices, or any other programs had parts or raw material that may have been heat treated, supplied, or tested by Temper-form USA. A follow-on email was sent to QAWG members in December 2002 to provide additional information and to clarify the request.

In February 2003 the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) sent a letter to the Secretary of Energy indicating its concerns with the Department's progress in addressing the Temperform USA issue. The letter requested a report that documented the implementation of the complete set of actions required to verify that no aluminum parts heat treated by Temperform USA are in use in safety-related or mission-sensitive applications.

Although the QAWG had collected a substantial amount of information, it was not clear that the investigation results were adequate or consistent or that they would support an adequate response to the Board's request. On March 18, 2003, the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health (EH) sent a memorandum to Environmental Management (EM) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requesting that they verify completion of their inquiries into possible use of items heat-treated by Temperform USA. On March 25, 2003, EH sent a memorandum to the other program offices also requesting that an investigation be conducted.

The EH memorandums included lines of inquiry that were used as a basis for conducting the investigations. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service gave the Department permission to release to Department contractors the affected part numbers and the identity of the companies that sent parts to Temperform USA. That list of the companies who had parts processed at Temperform USA or who approved Temperform USA as a vendor was included with the EH memorandums. The part number list (a 1,200 plus page document) was made available to the program offices to support their investigations. The EH memorandums and lines of inquiry are included as Attachment One.

All of the responsible program offices completed their investigations and submitted the results of their reviews to EH. The investigations identified some materials and parts procured from Temperform or vendors. However, the investigations confirmed that these materials/parts were not used in any safety-related or mission-sensitive application at any site. The total reported cost associated with this investigation is $240,737.77.

In the case or EM and NNSA, a report was previously provided to the Board in response to their concern in this area. A summary of the conclusions provided in that report, as well as the results of the other program office investigations are provided below. Additionally, copies of the program office responses provided to EH are included as Attachment Two.

Investigation Results

Location	Temperform or Temperform Vendor?	Safety-Related or Mission Sensitive?	Disposition	Reported Investigative Cost
National Nuclear Security Administration				
SSO/SNL	Yes	No	Action Completed – Records reviewed. Verified no safety system or mission sensitive application.	$3,500.00 – SNL $3,000.00 - SSO
PXSO/BWXT	Yes	No	Action Completed – Records reviewed. Verified no safety system or mission sensitive application.	$7,5400.00 – BWXT $713.00 - PXSO
SRSO/WSRC	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable.	$2,175.00 – WSRC $2475.00 - SRSO
LASO/LANL	Yes	No	Action Completed – Records reviewed. Verified no safety system or mission sensitive application.	$6,000.00 – LASO $83,000.00 – LANL Parts replacement – $17,000.00 – LANL
YSO/BWXT	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable.	$600.00 – YSO $1220.00 - BWXT
LSO/LLNL	Yes	No	Action Completed – Records reviewed. Verified no safety system or mission sensitive application.	$12,750.00 – LLNL $4,000.00 - LSO
KCSO/ Honeywell	Yes	No	Action Completed – Records reviewed. Verified no safety system or mission sensitive application.	$3,582.00 – Honeywell $600.00 – KCSO
Nevada Test Site	Yes	No	Action Completed – Records reviewed. Verified no safety system or mission sensitive application.	$2,500.00 – Bechtel $3,000.00 - NSO
Environmental Management				
Carlsbad Field Office	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$86.64
Idaho	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$4,860.00
Ohio	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$1,789.00

Location	Temperform or Temperform Vendor?	Safety-Related or Mission Sensitive?	Disposition	Reported Investigative Cost
Oak Ridge	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Insignificant
Office of River Protection	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$5,883.00
Rocky Flats	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$380.13
Richland	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	BHI - $2,500.00 PNNL - $3,650.00
Savannah River	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$750.00
Office of Science				
AMES	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$4,000.00
ANL – E/W	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$4,000.00
BNL	Yes	Not Applicable	Items purchased were procured specifically for non-safety applications. These items were either subsequently discarded, manufactured prior to 1998, or used in assembly tables and tooling. Not deemed necessary to track.	$23,000.00
FNAL	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$11,120.00
LBNL				$10,000.00
ORNL	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$8,814.00
PNNL	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$3,650.00
PPPL	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	$1,000.00
SLAC				$1,600.00
TJNAF	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Insignificant

Location	Temperform or Temperform Vendor?	Safety-Related or Mission Sensitive?	Disposition	Reported Investigative Cost
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy				
NREL	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Insignificant
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management				
Yucca Mountain	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Insignificant
Yucca Mountain	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Insignificant
Fossil Energy				
All FE Field Sites	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Insignificant

ATTACHMENT ONE

EH Investigation Request and Lines of Inquiry

ATTACHMENT TWO

Program Office Response Memorandums

3.10 Sample List of SME Contacts to Notify of Important Issues November 2003

Anyone identifying names that should be changed are encouraged to provide the update information to Rick Green, EH-32 at 301-903-7709 rick.green@eh.doe.gov , Tom Williams, EH-32 at 301-903-4859 tom.e.williams@eh.doe.gov, or Mark Petts, EH-32 at 301-903-2414 mark.petts@eh.doe.gov

1. DOE Office of **Aviation** Management, Robert Jenkins robert.g.jenkins@hq.doe.gov, James Combs jcombs@doeal.gov
2. **Backup Power** Working Group, John Fredlund, NNSA HQ John.Fredlund@nnsa.doe.gov
3. **Chemical Safety** Topical Committee, Gail Kleiner, Gail.kleiner@hq.doe.gov
4. **Construction Safety**, Pat Finn, pat.finn@eh.doe.gov
5. DOE **Chief Information Officer**, Brenda Coblentz, Brenda.coblentz@hq.doe.gov
6. **Emergency Management** SIG, Dorothy Manning, manningd@orau.gov
7. **Energy Facility Contractors Group** (includes maintaneance, SQA), Joe Yanek, joseph.yanek@srs.gov
8. **Fire Protection** Topical Committee, Jim Bisker, jim.bisker@eh.doe.gov
9. DOE Office of **General Counsel**, Paul Gervas, PAUL.GERVAS@hq.doe.gov
10. DOE **Hoisting and Rigging** Technical Advisory Committee, Pat Finn, pat.finn@eh.doe.gov
11. **Industrial Hygiene/Occupational Safety** SIG, Deborah McFalls, mcfallsd@orau.gov
12. DOE Office of **Inspectors General**, Brent Burdick, BRENT.BURDICK@hq.doe.gov
13. **Packaging Management** Council, Ashok Kapoor, DOE-AL, and Jim Johnston, LANL hmconslt@lanl.gov
14. **Performance Based Management** SIG, Paul Krumpe, paul.krumpe@dp.doe.gov
15. **Procurement**, Richard H. Hopf, ME-60 202-586-8613 Richard.Hopf@hq.doe.gov
16. **Quality and Safety Management** Special Interest Group (QSM-SIG) Katherine Brack kjbrack@pantex.com, , *Bud Danielson bud.danielson@eh.doe.gov , Denise Viator viatord@orau.gov
17. DOE **Radiation Control** Coordinating Committee, Maria Gavilras-Guinn Gavrilas-guinn@em.doe.gov, , Joel Rabovsky, joel.rabovsky@hq.doe.gov
18. **Safety Analysis Software** Group, Dae Chung, Dae.chung@nnsa.doe.gov
19. **Security**, Ron Edge, SO-11, Program Manager 301-903-4247 Ronnie.Edge@hq.doe.gov
20. DOE Contractors **Supplier Quality Information** Group (SQIG), Steve Stein, steinl@bnl.gov
21. **Transportation** External Coordination Working Group, Judith Holm, Co-Chair jholm@doeal.gov
22. NNSA **Weapons Quality** Assurance, Joel Smith joel.smith@nnsa.doe.gov
23. **Welding** Topical Committee, William S. Harker harkerws@id.doe.gov

3.11 Sample S/CI or Defective Item Distribution List

This list is used to forward significant new S/C-DI information (e.g., alerts, training manuals) via e-mail to registered users of the S/C-DI website. The S/C-DI push mail distribution list is comprised of at least two separate alphabetized lists of registered S/C-DI website users and is available at
O:\QA EH-3 and historical QAWG\Contacts\ SCI Registered Users with DNFSB w-o most EH.
This list is updated by EH-3 staff as additions and deletions are identified.



3.12 S/CI Annual Report Example

The S/CI annual report is available at http://www.eh.doe.gov/sci/ under the title ***"Analysis and Trending of Suspect/Counterfeit Items at DOE Facilities."***

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3.13 S/CI Annual Report Example (continued)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report was prepared by the Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH), to disseminate information regarding Department of Energy (DOE) suspect/counterfeit items (S/CI) and defective items. EH has assumed responsibility for activities associated with S/CI and defective items from the Department of Energy (DOE) Quality Assurance Working Group (QAWG). Within EH, the Office of Corporate Performance Assessment (EH-3) now routinely collects, screens, dispositions, and communicates information on S/CI and defective items that could potentially impact operations at DOE facilities.
This semiannual report updates the S/CI report issued in April 2003 by the QAWG, and includes data on S/CI events reported in the Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) between January 1, 1991, and June 30, 2003. The report provides the DOE complex with general information, trends and analyses about S/CI and defective items and related quality assurance/procurement issues. As described in the report the following is a summary of the current S/CI and defective items:

? S/CI events reported during the first six months of 2003 (26) continue to be reported at a rate similar to 2002 (54).

? There were no injuries or near misses resulting from S/CI within the DOE complex.

? While the number of S/CI reports has decreased since the peak of 144 in 1994, the number of S/CI events reported has remained relatively constant (approximately 55 per year) since 2000.

? During the previous reporting period from January 1991 through December 2002, ORPS reports indicated that 92% of S/CI pertained to fasteners. During the current reporting period, 81% of the reported S/CI events pertain to fasteners.

? During the previous reporting period from January 1991 through December 2002, approximately 74% of all S/CI were found subsequent to installation. During the current reporting period, this improved to 65% for the reported S/CI events pertaining to installed items.

The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) conducted a special study of the Department's management of S/CI, including a recent issue regarding improperly heat-treated aluminum. The OA report indicates that some S/CI processes were effective at some DOE sites. However, there were weaknesses in the S/CI processes at DOE Headquarters and most sites in a number of important areas including timeliness and thoroughness in acting on S/CI.

The entire report is also accessible on the EH website at http://www.eh.doe.gov/sci/.